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Who Will Be Idol? 
The Importance of Social Networks for Winning on Reality Shows
* 
 
This paper examines, both theoretically and empirically, the effect of social networks and 
belonging to minority groups (or race) on the probability of winning in reality television shows. 
We develop a theoretical model that studies viewer behavior by presenting a framework of 
competition between two contestants from two different groups. The results are examined 
empirically using unique contestant data from the highly popular reality show “A Star Is Born”, 
the Israeli counterpart of “American Idol”. Our main finding is that social networks and 
belonging to minority groups play key roles in the contestant’s victory, but their effects are 
nonlinear: the social network effect is U-shaped, whereas that of belonging to a minority 
group follows an inverted U shape. Beyond the world of reality TV, this paper sheds light on 
the general behavior of social networks as well. 
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1. Introduction 
 
“American Idol”—based on the British TV show “Pop Idol”, is the most popular and 
successful reality show on America's FOX TV network. “American Idol” is a singing 
competition, aimed at determining the best undiscovered young singers in the country. 
The judging system is democratic, with everyone being able to vote for his or her 
favorite contestant. In the 2007 season, “American Idol” drew a massive audience of 
37.7 million viewers, peaking in the last half hour at more than 41 million viewers, 
and received a record 74 million votes.
1 The “American Idol” format is successful 
worldwide. It has a plethora of spinoffs, including “Australian Idol”, “Canadian Idol”, 
“Indian  Idol”,  “Idols  West  Africa”,  “Latin  American  Idol”,  “New  Zealand  Idol”, 
“Pinoy Idol” (in the Philippines), and “A Star Is Born” (in Israel), to name a few. 
  Although the aim of “American Idol” and its counterparts is to find the most 
talented young singer in the country, viewer preferences may be affected by a variety 
of  considerations  beyond  those  of  contestant  ability  or  performance.  The  case  of 
Sanjaya Malakar is an example of this: Malakar advanced to 7th place in season 6 of 
“American  Idol”  by  getting  the  popular  vote,  despite  poor  reviews  by  the  show's 
judges. One of those judges, Simon Cowell, threatened that if Malakar won, he would 
not return to judge the following show, even though he was contractually obligated to 
do so. Other competitors who won praises from the judges, like Antonella Barba, 
were eliminated in preliminary rounds. The British Rock star Elton John, once a guest 
judge  on  “American  Idol”,  came  right  out  with  the  claim  that  the  voting  by  the 
national viewing audience was “incredibly racist”.
2 
Lee (2006) dealt with the question of whether the viewers of “American Idol” 
are racially biased by using ratings data from the first four seasons, 2002 through 
2005. He found that the racial composition of the contestants affects the viewing of 
black and non-black households, such that as the share of black contestants increases, 
the  black  households’  rating  increases,  whereas  the  non-black  households’  rating 
decreases. Lee (2006) also found strong evidence for same-race preferences in the 
                                           
1 Source: Wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_Idol). 
2 According to Reuters, Source: http://au.news.yahoo.com/040427/11/oqwi.html. 
   3 
voting: a black contestant was less likely to be voted off when there were relatively 
more black viewers.  
A vast number of economic and sociological studies have taken on the subject of 
same-race  preferences  (see,  for  example,  Marshall,  1974;  Holzer  and  Ihlanfeldt, 
1998).  Becker’s  pioneer  study  (1971)  identified  three  principal  sources  of  racial 
discrimination: discrimination by employers, discrimination by fellow workers, and 
discrimination by consumers. Becker discussed the issue of consumer discrimination 
directly  reducing  productivity,  making  it  impossible  to  tell  whether  differential 
productivity is the effect of discrimination or of differential ability to  do the job. 
Studies show that racial preferences or racial discrimination begin at a young age. 
Clark and Clark (1950) showed that 3- to 7-year-olds already had racial preferences: 
most of white skin children preferred dolls with white skin color and rejected dolls 
with brown skin color. They also found that the children’s knowledge of the concept 
of racial difference had been established with the age. These racial preferences can 
then be expressed in choice of spouse, neighborhood, friends and even favorite TV 
show (see, for example, Wong, 2003). 
Preferences  for,  or  identification  with  specific  contestants,  irrespective  of 
ability,  can  also  be  explained  by  social  networks.  There  is  a  substantial  body  of 
economic and sociological literature on the important role played by social networks 
in  human  interactions  and  in  communicating  valuable  information  (see  Bala  and 
Goyal,  2000).  This  information  may  include,  among  other  things,  job  and 
accommodation options, business opportunities, stock market tips and product quality. 
For example, Montgomery (1991) presented a long list of studies on the important 
role of social ties, such as friends and relatives, in job-search outcomes. Carrington et 
al. (1996) investigated the effect of social networks on immigrants' choice of location 
in their host country. A social network is created among two or more people with a 
common denominator, which can be broad (such as belonging to the same minority or 
religious group, or living in the same city) or narrow (such as learning in the same 
class, working in the same office).  
Despite the development and enormous success of reality TV shows worldwide, 
to the best of our knowledge, there have not been any economics studies examining 
the relationship between social networks and viewers’ behavior in reality TV shows, 
except for the aforementioned study by Lee (2006) on same-race preferences. The 
economics studies that do exist on reality shows investigate the structure and rules of   4 
the contest. For example, Amegashie (2007) studied the allocation of voting rights 
between the expert judges and the viewers on “American Idol”, designed to prevent 
low-ability contestants from winning. He showed that the contestants' differences in 
ability should be an important consideration in the allocation of voting rights. Fu and 
Lu  (2006)  examined  the  optimal  structure  of  multistage  sequential-elimination 
contests and the optimal prize allocation, such as in “American Idol”. They focused 
on the “winner-take-all” type of contest, i.e., a single winner and a single prize.    
This paper starts by developing a theoretical model of competition between two 
different groups where each member decides how much effort to invest in favor of the 
contestant from his/her group. We study how the number of group members affects 
the strength of the relationship among the members. The effect of the benefit from the 
contestant’s  victory  on  the  optimal  effort  is  also  examined.  Our  results  are  tested 
empirically using a unique dataset of contestants from the popular Israeli reality show 
“A Star Is Born”, which is based on “American Idol”. We distinguish between the 
behaviors of viewers from big cities and that of viewers from small areas, as well as 
between viewers from centrally located areas and those from the periphery. 
Although this paper focuses on the effects of social networks and race on the 
behavior of reality-show voters, the results can be applied to a variety of situations, 
such as voter support of a candidate belonging to their minority group or who was 
born in their country. For example, Sen. Barak Obama, like the black leader Jesse 
Jackson in '84 and '88, recently beat Sen. Hillary Clinton in the racially charged state 
of South Carolina. About half of the voters were black and four out of five of them 
supported Obama. Obama got only a quarter of the white votes while Clinton and Sen. 
John Edwards split the rest. Obama declared that “The choice in this election is not 
about regions or religions or genders…it's not about black versus white,” but it can be 
explained by our model on social networks and voter behavior. 
This  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  2  describes  the  analyzed  reality 
show,  “A  Star  Is  Born”.  Section  3  displays  a  theoretical  model  of  competition 
between two contestants from two different groups. Section 4 presents the empirical 




   5 
2. Background—“A Star Is Born” 
 
“A Star Is Born”, which began its first season in 2003, is one of the most popular 
Israeli TV shows. “A Star Is Born”, like its counterpart “American Idol”, belongs to 
the new popular TV genre of reality shows. Reality shows are based on three main 
elements: 1) contestants are given a particular task; 2) at the completion of the task, 
the participants are critiqued; 3) one of the contestants is then eliminated from the 
competition (see Higdon, 2007). More than 31.2% of the Israeli population (35.9% of 
the Jewish population) watched the final of the "A Star Is Born" competition in 2007.
3 
The number of votes in the final amounted to more than 900,000, as compared to 
about 3,186,000 votes in the country's general election in 2006.  
Like “American Idol”, “A Star Is Born” begins with preliminary auditions in 
selected  locations  across  Israel.  Tens  of  thousands  of  candidates  (about  40,000  in 
2007)  with  the  dream  of  becoming  an  idol  are  tested,  interviewed  and  most  are 
eliminated before the individual auditions in front of three main judges. The body of 
judges includes the best singers and artists; sometimes a fourth guest judge may be 
added. In the next stage, the judges choose an initial field of about 100 candidates and 
after a lengthy process, they narrow them down to a team of about 20 competitors. 
Although this top team is selected by expert judges, the viewers can marginally affect 
their  decision  by  granting  a  “life-preserver”  to  selected  candidates  who  were 
eliminated in the auditions, thereby returning them to the show.  
When the auditioning stage is over, the power shifts from the expert judges to 
the  viewers.  The  candidates  sing  solos  and  duets  and  deal  with  different  musical 
genres, and the viewers are given a limited amount of time following each broadcast 
to vote for their favorite contestant via SMS from cellular phones or voting on the 
internet. Compared to “American Idol” which enables voting via a toll-free number, 
the voting for “A Star Is Born” costs 1 NIS per call. Another main difference between 
the rules of these two shows is that whereas in “American Idol” viewers are allowed 
to vote as many times as they like for any number of contestants, the voting in Israel 
is limited to five votes per voting method.
4 The viewers can, of course, bypass this 
restriction by voting from different cellular phones and computers. The contestant 
                                           
3 Source: Wikipedia in Hebrew (www.he.wikipedia.org). 
4 This rule was not valid in the first three seasons, when the number of votes was limited to 250.   6 
who  obtains  the  lowest  number  of  votes  from  the  public  is  eliminated  from  the 
competition.  In each show, one  contestant is voted off, up until the quarter-finals 
when about eight contestants are left. Six of these contestants move on to the semi-
finals, where two groups of three contestants each compete. The winner of each group 
in the semi-finals moves on to the finals and a competition between the two second-
place contestants produce the third contestant in the finals. 
During the season, the viewers can learn about the contestants’ personalities, 
their  hobbies,  their  resumes  and  their  socioeconomic  backgrounds  via  their  blogs, 
official and unofficial websites, interviews and articles in magazines and newspapers, 
as well as from watching the show itself. The contestants' socioeconomic background 
and the minority groups to which they belong are emphasized in the media. Towards 
the  finals,  the  viewers  get  a  glimpse  of  the  contestants'  residences.  On  fan-based 
websites and the show's official website, among the reasons why one should vote for a 
specific individual we can easily find sentences such as: “I am voting for Daniel Ben-
Haim because he lives in Migdal-Haemek,” “I am not voting for Marina because she 
is Russian,” or “All the people who come from Georgia must vote for Refael Mirela.” 
Take the example of Miriam Tokan, the show's first Arabic contestant. Her being 
voted off spurred a widespread public debate on racist voting. Several articles were 
written on the topic, a central question being whether the show, which is a symbol of 
Israeli consensus, could afford to have an Arabic singer as its winner. The Arab-
Israeli  cabinet  minister  Raleb  Majadele  described  Tokan  as  a  young  woman  who 
overcame fear, broke the barriers and gave hope to all Arabic teenagers. In a letter to 
Tokan he wrote: “your angelic voice was a source of pride for me.” 
In every season of “A Star Is Born”, there have been spontaneous as well as 
formal public activities in favor of a specific contestant by his/her community for 
reasons  unrelated  to  talent  (see  Neiger  and  Yosman,  2005).  For  example,  the 
Ashkelon city council printed and displayed posters citywide which called for people 
to vote for Zipi Mashhid, a resident of that city. The city of Maale Edomim organized 
a  campaign  in  favor  of  its  resident,  Arel  Moyal:  for  the  finals,  the  city  gathered 
together dozens of teenagers to sit in the schools and vote the free 250 times for   7 
Moyal.
5 The mayor explained that the city’s support was in essence a way of thanking 
the contestant for the honor he had brought to the city. In the finals, Moyal overcame 
Skat, the contestant from Kfar Saba, who had led throughout the contest. Kfar Saba 
thought it enough to send emails reminding the city’s workers to vote for Skat. The 
organizing of families, relatives and friends is also common: these groups may open 
“command centers” where each individual member contacts everybody he/she knows 
asking them to vote for the group's favorite contestant as many times as possible. 
 
3. The theoretical model 
 
Consider two reality-show contestants,  A and  B , belonging to two different groups 
or from two different locations. The probability of each contestant winning depends 
on the relative number of votes he/she receives. Each group allocates resources and 
effort in favor of its contestant. Although rent-seeking models usually refer to interest 
groups that attempt to influence the outcomes of the political decision-making process 
in their favor via resource allocation (see for example, Appelbaum and Katz, 1987), 
here we adopt a standard model of rent seeking among interest groups.  
Denote the number of group members for a contestant  , i i A B ∀ =  by  i N  and 
each  member's  effort  in  favor  of  that  contestant  by i E .  Hence  the  probability  of 
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It  should  be  noted  that  this  probability  function  is  identical  to  Tullock’s  (1980) 
commonly  used  rule  which  claims  that  the  probability  of  success  in  competition 
equals the relative effort. We treat belonging to a contestant’s group as a club good 
                                           
5 The relative weight of those teenagers was high because most of the viewers, 73.9%, chose to cast 
between 1 and 10 votes by each of the two routes whereas only 3% of them cast 250 votes via each of 
the two routes.     8 
that provides positive returns to the participants in the club (see Iannaccone, 1992). 
The  decision  of  the  group’s  members  as  to  how  much  effort  to  invest  in  their 
contestant is affected by their benefit from his/her winning,  i B , which depends on the 
group’s size,  i N , and the socioeconomic status of the group,  i S . As the group gets 
bigger, the relationship of the groups’ members with the contestant weakens and their 









the lower the socioeconomic status of the group, the higher the benefit from the honor 







< . The utility if the contestant 
loses the competition is normalized to zero. Our assumption may be supported by 
Narud and Share (1999) who found that party activists, belonging to extremist and 
small  groups,  invest  more  efforts  in  support  of  their  candidates  than  activists 
belonging to larger groups, indicating that their utility from their candidate’s victory 
is higher.  
The expected net payoff for each member of group i is given by:  
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We  focus  on  the  interior  Nash  equilibrium  of  the  contest.  The  conditions 
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From equation (3), we get that at equilibrium, the optimal effort of each member of 
group  , i i A B ∀ = ∀ = ∀ = ∀ =  equals: 
 
                                           
6 Suppose, for example, that the group contains only two people: if one of them wins the contest, the 
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for  and , . i j j A B ≠ = ≠ = ≠ = ≠ =  
 
To determine the probability of the contestant from group  A being the winner at 
equilibrium, we plug equation (4) into equation (1): 
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This means that the probability of a contestant from group  i winning is equal to the 
sum of the benefits to group i’s members from the victory of their contestant divided 
by the sum of the benefits to the two groups’  members from the victory of their 
respective contestants.  
Let  us  now  examine  the  effect  of  the  number  of  group  members  on  the 
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. To determine whether the extreme point is a 
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The last component in brackets in the numerator is clearly negative; in addition, we 
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Thus, the effect of a change in the number of group members on the probability of 
their contestant succeeding in the contest is determined by the rate of the effect of 
change in the number of group members on the benefit culled by each member if their 
contestant  wins.  It  is  known  that  as  the  number  of  group  members  increases,  the 
strength of the relationship between them or their identification with the contestant 








); however, the rate of that decrease is unknown.  
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relationship between the number of group members and the probability of winning 
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), then 
the relationship between the number of group members and the probability of winning 
has a U shape (Figure 2).  
 
Next we examine the effect of the group's socioeconomic status on the probability of 









































There is a negative relationship between the socioeconomic status of the group and 
the probability of its contestant winning. 
 
We expect that when the contestant belongs to a group characterized by low 
socioeconomic status, the benefit to the group members from his/her victory will be 
higher  than  for  group  members  with  high  socioeconomic  characteristics.  This  is 
because the victory brings the former group, which has a negative image, positive 
exposure and the hope that additional members will succeed, as in the aforementioned 
case of the Arabic contestant Miriam Tokan. Therefore, the members of this group 
will increase their efforts in support of their contestant.  
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In words, there is a positive 
relationship  between  the  benefit  to  the  group’s  members  from  the  victory  of  the 
contestant and his/her probability of winning. This result is supported by many studies 
which have shown that the player with the higher net payoff invests more resources in   12 
the  contest  and  has  a  higher  probability  of  winning  the  contest  (see  for  example, 
Epstein and Nitzan, 2002). 
 
4. Empirical evidence 
 
4.1 Summary statistics 
 
Following the theoretical model presented above, we examine the effect of social 
networks  on  the  probability  of  winning  a  competition  using  unique  data  on  the 
contestants of “A Star Is Born” for all five seasons, 2003 through 2007. Our dataset 
contains 103 individuals who reached the televised rounds, i.e. the rounds in which 
the audience participates in the judgment process. A listing of our data sources can be 
found in the Appendix.  
The  key  explanatory  variables  in  our  analysis  measure  social  networks. 
Following Bertrand et al (2000), Epstein et al. (2007) and others, we use two proxy 
variables to represent the social networks which exist within localities and within 
minority groups: the first is the number of residents in the contestant’s location of 
residence,  the  second  is  the  number  of  members  in  his/her  minority  group  across 
Israel (if the contestant belongs to a minority  group).In addition, the strength and 
width of social networks may vary by age, and teenagers also have more interest in 
reality TV programs than older people. Hence, we use the share of young people in 
the contestant's place of residence as another explanatory variable in the probability of 
success in the contest.  From the theoretical model, it follows that  as the viewers' 
benefit  from  their  contestant  winning  increases,  so  will  the  effort  they  invest  in 
him/her. We take the socioeconomic level of the contestant’s location of residence as 
a  proxy  variable  for  the  benefit  incurred  by  the  residents  from  their  contestant 
winning, i.e., the lower the socioeconomic level of the location, the more negative 
press they receive, such as widespread unemployment, poverty, crime, etc. Therefore, 
the benefit to these residents from positive exposure in the media and the hope and 
honor brought about by a victory is higher than that to residents of a location with 
high socioeconomic level. We also control for other variables that may affect the 
probability of winning the contest, such as: gender, age and musical experience.  
Table 1 displays summary statistics of the contestants and the characteristics of 
their locations of residence. About half of the contestants are male. Their average age   13 
is about 21.5 years. About 27% of the contestants served in the army's entertainment 
troop. It should be noted that the selection criteria for this unit are quite high and it 
has yielded many top Israeli singers. More than a quarter of the contestants have other 
(formal)  musical  experience,  although  the  definition  of  what  constitutes  this 
experience is rather broad: some contestants have a wealth of experience performing 
at festivals, whereas some contestants sang in their school's choir; some contestants 
have  been  singing  from  a  young  age,  whereas  some  began  singing  in  front  of 
audiences only a short time before the competition. Due to data limitations and the 
difficulty involved in quantifying the quality of the musical experience, we only use a 
dummy variable for other musical experience.  
About a fifth of the contestants belong to minority groups which include: new 
immigrants from the former Soviet Union, new immigrants from Ethiopia, people 
with Yemenite origin, people with Georgian origin, national-religious men and Arabs. 
We define a contestant as belonging to a minority group only if it is discernible to the 
viewers by his/her name, behavior or other external signs (for example, the kippah 
traditionally worn by religious men). We define a contestant as an immigrant if he/she 
was born abroad and this can be discerned by the viewers, or his/her parents were 
born abroad and he/she has strong ties to this group, for example, by highlighting this 
in performances and singing ethnic music.
7 The largest minority group is immigrants 
from the former Soviet Union, with about 930,000 people.  
The variable Location size describes the number of residents in the contestant’s 
residence location. The largest city is Jerusalem with about 450,000 residents and the 
smallest location is the regional council of Nahal Sorek, with about 2,400 residents. 
More than 40% of the contestants live in big cities, i.e. a city with more than 150,000 
residents  (this  being  the  limit  that  affects  the  results).  In  our  analysis,  we  were 
interested in the contestants' social networks relative to the other contestants in the 
same competition; we therefore used size of residence location as a percentile. The 
variable Location percentile describes the percentile of the location's size relative to 
the location sizes of the other contestants' residences in the same season. A particular 
                                           
7 For example, Boaz Mauda, the winner of
 season 5 (2007) and the representative of Israel in the 
Eurovision 2008, was nicknamed “the Yemenite cowboy” in the press - despite the fact that he was 
born in Israel - because of his appearance, his residence in a Yemenite enclave (moshav), his choice of 
ethnic songs and his strong ties to the Yemenite tradition.    14 
location's  size  percentile  can  differ  from  year  to  year.  For  instance,  in  the  2004 
competition, the percentile of the city of Ashdod was 70, whereas it was the largest 
city in the 2006 competition (i.e. its percentile was set at 100).  
The variable Socioeconomic cluster is an index of the socioeconomic level of a 
location, ranked from 1 to 10. This index is prepared by the Israeli Central Bureau of 
Statistics. It takes into account a variety of parameters such as: median age, average 
income  per  capita,  unemployment  rate,  housing  density,  rate  of  households  with 
computers, average number of cars per household, etc. The average socioeconomic 
cluster of the contestants' residence locations is around 6. Another variable is the 
Share of young people (aged 10-24 years) in the contestant's location of residence. It 
is assumed that young people have a greater interest in the singing competition, and 
therefore play  a larger  part in the voting than older people. The average share of 
young people is 26%. Netivot leads in the list with more than 40% young people, 
whereas Givataim is in last place, with only 17%. 
 
4.2 Method 
In the theory section we modeled the probability of winning. This is however too 
simplistic for our empirical application. The reason is that the contest is conducted in 
several stages. In each stage, some of the contestants advance to the next stage, while 
the others are eliminated. Therefore, we choose as a dependent variable the highest 
stage of the competition reached by the contestant. We would have preferred to use 
the number (or percent) of votes received by each contestant, but these data are not 
available: we only know who obtains the fewest votes and is eliminated. Of course, as 
the contestant survives more rounds, the implication is that he/she has more votes than 
the contestants who are voted off. Hence, we treat the number of votes as a latent 
continuous variable that determines the probability of winning (as in the theoretical 
model) as well as the highest stage achieved (as in the empirical application). 
Table 2 presents two possible divisions into stages, with each stage including the 
value  of  the  dependent  variable  and  the  percentage  of  observations.  The  first 
possibility is division into six stages: first place, second place, third place, semi-final, 
quarter-final and others. The second division possibility consists of three stages: takes 
part in the final (i.e., the three top places), takes part in the semi-final or quarter-final, 
and others. The first division possibility has two main problems: in “A Star Is Born”, 
the judges can grant “immunity” to one contestant per round until the semi-finals (if   15 
there is consensus among the judges). This means that this contestant will move on to 
the  next  round  even  if  he/she  receives  the  lowest  number  of  votes.  This  can 
marginally affect the results because sometimes the “immune” contestant is the one 
that  would  have  otherwise  been  eliminated.
8  Moreover,  the  weight  of  the  judges’ 
score in the finals and semi-finals is 25% (75% being the share of the viewer votes), 
and thus the judges can influence the order of the three finalists. Unfortunately, we do 
not have accurate information on the contestants’ rankings without the judges’ scores. 
The second problem in the first division possibility is scarcity of observations for the 
first three places, i.e., amounting to less than 5% (see Table 1); however, if we refer to 
this group as one category, it contains almost 15% of the observations. We therefore 
adopt the second division possibility, i.e. division into three stages.  
Ordered Logit models are used to estimate the relationship between the stage 
reached by the contestant and a set of independent variables (see Greene, 2002). The 
Ordered  Logit  model  specifies  the  probability  of  observing  outcome  i  as  the 
probability  that  a  linear  function  of  explanatory  variables  plus  a  random  error,  is 
within the range of the cut points estimated for the outcome: 
 
(10)  ( ) 1 1 1 2 2 Pr( ) Pr ... , 1,..., j i j j k kj j i outcome i k x x x u k i I β β β − = = < + + + + ≤ =   
 
where  j u  is assumed to be logistically distributed.  In either case, the coefficients 
1 2 , ,..., k β β β   along  with  the  cut  points,  1 2 1 , , I k k k −   are  estimated,  where  I   is  the 
number of possible outcomes,  0 k  is taken as −∞ and  I k  as +∞. 
The  estimated  coefficients  of  the  Ordered  Logit  model  cannot  be  readily 
interpreted. They represent marginal effects of each variable on the unobserved latent 
variable from which the ordered outcomes are derived should be estimated, but these 
marginal effects are conditional on normalizing the error variance to 1. Hence, we 
will refer to the signs of these marginal effects rather than on their magnitude.   
The  data  is  composed  of  observations  on  contestants  from  five  consecutive 
seasons; this gives rise to the possibility that the standard errors are correlated within 
                                           
8 For example, in season 5 (2007), Alisa Shparaga rose to the semi-finals only thanks to “immunity” 
from the judges.   16 
each  season.  We  therefore  derive  cluster-robust  standard  errors  for  the  statistical 
inference. 
   
4.3 Results 
 
Table 3 presents the results. Due to correlation between the variables Location size 
and Minority group size, we run segregated regressions with each social network’s 
variable  in  columns  (1)  and  (2).  Column  (3)  displays  the  regression  with  both 
variables. As expected from our theoretical model, we find that the effect of social 
network  variables  on  the  level  of  success  in  the  competition  is  not  linear  -  the 
variables behave differently: the minority group size has an inverted U-shaped effect 
on the probability of winning in the contest whereas the location size has a U-shaped 
effect on this probability. The inverted U and U shapes are retained in the combined 
regression in column (3), but the significance decreases because of the correlation. 
Our results indicate that the size of the minority group increases the level of success 
as long as it is lower than about 550,000, and decreases the level of success above this 
cutoff point. Hence, contestants from “medium-size” minorities have a higher level of 
success relative to contestants from smaller or bigger minority groups. The Increasing 
location percentile decreases the probability of winning as long as it is below 65%, 
and increases the probability above that cutoff, such that contestants from the biggest 
and smallest locations have better chances of winning the contest. 
The location's socioeconomic cluster has a significant effect only in big cities 
(i.e. city with 150,000 residents or more).
910 As expected, its effect is negative, i.e. 
contestants from big cities have a higher probability of winning the contest as the 
socioeconomic level of their location decreases. The variable Share of young people 
also  has  a  significant  and  positive  effect  only  in  big  cities.
11  The  fact  that  these 
variables are significant only for big cities can be explained as follows: in big cities, 
                                           
9 When we estimated the regression with the variables socioeconomic cluster, Share of young people, 
and their interactions with big cities, the results does not change qualitatively. 
10 We examined the existence of different effects of economic cluster and share of young people in big 
versus small locations, but we found a significant effect only for big locations. 
11 As explained in the Appendix, this variable is based on the 1995 population census (the most recent 
Israeli census), so it may not precisely represent today's situation. However, the essence of the results 
did not change when we left this variable out.   17 
the  probability  of  a  viewer  from  the  contestant's  residence  location  knowing  the 
contestant  (or  his/her  family)  personally  is  rather  small,  and  the  feeling  of 
membership and identification with the contestant is weak. If the viewer votes for a 
contestant  from  his/her  location,  he/she  is  probably  doing  so  to  benefit  from  that 
contestant's becoming the winner. The lower the socioeconomic level of the location, 
the greater the viewer's benefit from positive advertisement and from the consequent 
hope  that  people  from  this  location  will  succeed  in  the  future;  however,  in  small 
locations, the personal connection with the contestant (or his/her extended family) and 
the identification with him/her is stronger than in big cities. Hence, people will invest 
effort  in  their  contestant,  even  if  the  benefit  from  positive  advertisement  is  low. 
Moreover, people in small locations will invest effort in their contestant even if they 
are adults and reality TV shows interest them less than they interest young people.  
The  variable  age  is  not  significant  in  any  of  the  regressions.  Note  that  its 
variance  is  rather  small  (table  1);  while  the  average  age  is  21.5,  80%  of  the 
contestants are aged 23 years or younger. Note that the rules of the contest determine 
a lower age limit, 16 years, but there is no upper limit (as opposed to “American Idol” 
which imposed an upper age limit of 24 years, which was then increased to 28 years). 
Nevertheless, the judges actually tend to select the younger contestants in the early 
auditions. Regarding gender, the judges and the show's producers try to prevent a 
situation in which all the finalists are males or females via some tools they have at 
their disposal (for example, dividing the contestants into two semi-finalist groups, 
granting “immunity”, the “life-preserver” option which returns contestants who were 
voted  off  the  program,  etc.).  Hence,  our  regressions  do  not  include  the  variable 
Gender.
12 
As expected, serving in the army's entertainment troop affects the prospects of 
success in the contest significantly and positively. However, surprisingly, the dummy 
variable of other musical experience is not significant. This can be explained by the 
broad  definition  of  this  variable:  some  contestants  have  a  wealth  of  musical 
experience, whereas some have very little, but we cannot distinguish between them. 
Another explanation is that the viewers prefer to vote for previously unknown singers. 
Table 4 presents the results when the dependent variable is divided into six stages. As 
mentioned  above,  this  division  is  somewhat  problematic  because  of  the  judges' 
                                           
12 The essence of the results does not change even if we include this variable.    18 
potential marginal effect on the stage a particular contestant reaches and because of 
the scarcity of observations for the top three places. However, we can see that the 
essence of the results does not change using this division.  
 
5. Discussion  
This paper has studied the effect of social networks of contestants on his probability 
of winning the contest, both theoretically and empirically. We examined two kinds of 
social networks: those based on the contestant’s place of residence and those based on 
minority groups if the contestant belongs to such a group. Our theoretical results show 
that the social networks’ behavior depend on the rate of the effect of change in the 
number of contestant’s group members on the benefit culled by each member if their 
contestant wins and on the socioeconomic status of the contestant’s group. 
We used contestant data from the highly popular reality show “A Star Is Born”, 
the Israeli counterpart of “American Idol”. We found that the effect of social network 
variables on the probability of winning the competition is not linear: the minority 
group size has an inverted U-shaped effect on the probability of winning the contest, 
whereas the location size has a U-shaped effect on this probability. This means that 
the  size  of  the  minority  group  initially  increases  the  probability  of  winning  and 
afterward decreases it, whereas the location size initially decreases the probability of 
winning and afterward increases it. We also found that the socioeconomic status of 
the contestant’s group significantly decreases the probability of winning the contest, 
but only for contestants from big cities.  
In this paper, we identified a number of significant attributes of social networks, 
related to voting in reality TV shows. While reality shows have become central and 
important in the culture and leisure life of millions across the world, there are almost 
no studies on the behavior of those people. Our theoretical model of the optimal effort 
of the individual in favor of his favorite contestant has been applied to the case of 
reality shows, but it can be applied to various other cases, such as membership in 
sport clubs, membership in church groups, supporting political candidates, etc.    19 
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Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Age 
 
21.446  2.757  16  30 
Minority group size (in 100,000) 
 
0.933  2.548  0  9.26420 
Location size (in 100,000) 
 
1.3236  1.1462  0.024  4.537 
Location percentile 
 
0.544  0.296  0.05  1 
Socioeconomic cluster  6.077 
 
1.569  3  10 
Share of young people  
 





Gender (%)                                             
Male                           50.49 
Female                       49.51 
 
Army entertainment troop (%) 
Yes                               27.18 
No                                72.82 
 
Other musical experience (%) 
Yes                              25.24 
No                                74.76 
 
Minority groups (%)               
Yes                              18.45 
No                               81.55 
 
Big city (%) 
Yes                               42.72                   
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Table 2. The Dependent Variable 
 
 




Value  Percent of  
observations 
 
Value  Percent of  
observations 
 
First place (takes part 





Second place (takes 
part in the final) 
 
5  4.85% 
Third place (takes part 
in the final) 
 
4  4.85% 








2  16.5% 
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Table 3. Ordered Logit Estimation of the Highest Stage Achieved in the 
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2 χ  
 
16.43  37.33  14.13 
Prob> 
2 χ  
 
0.002  0.000  0.006 
Pseudo 
2 R  
 
0.163  0.119  0.183 
Number of observations 
 
103  103  103 
 
Notes: 
1.  Cluster-robust Z values are denoted in parentheses. 
2.  ***, **,* denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively. 
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Table 4. Ordered Logit Estimation of the Highest Stage Achieved in the 
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2 χ  
 
0.024  0.000  0.000 
Pseudo 







Number of observations 
 
103  103  103 
 
Notes: 
1.  Cluster-robust Z values are denoted in parentheses. 
2.  ***, **,* denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively. 
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Appendix—data sources  
 
1. Personal data on the contestants 
Personal data on the contestants such as: gender, age, residence, musical experience, 
belonging to minority groups and the stage that he/she reached in the competition 
were collected from the official website of “A Star Is Born”, fan websites, personal 
websites, contestant blogs and watching the programs. The official website of “A Star 
Is Born” only contains full details on the contestants from seasons 4 and 5 (years 
2006-2007) and was used as the basis for data on the contestants from those seasons. 
The data on contestants from earlier seasons were collected from the other mentioned 
sources. 
The main websites from which the data were drawn are: 
Official website of “A Star Is Born 5”: 
http://www.keshet-tv.com/Starborn5/Default.aspx 
Official website of “A Star Is Born 4”: 
http://www.keshet-tv.com/Starborn4/Default.aspx 
Links to contestants personal websites:  
http://index.nana10.co.il/category.asp?cat=3144 
Details on season 3 contestants: 
http://www.tve.co.il/mini.asp?id=31 
Details on season 2 contestants: 
http://www.tapuz.co.il/blog/userBlog.asp?FolderName=KohavNolad2 
Details on season 1 contestants: 
http://mooma.keshet-tv.com/Discs.asp?ArtistID=29&AlbumID=39331 
 
2. Data on residence location and minority group characteristics 
•  The  number  of  residents  in  a  locality  and  the  minority  group  sizes  were 
obtained from the Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract of Israel for 
the years 2003-2007. 
•  The  socioeconomic  clusters  of  residence  localities  were  collected  from  the 
Central  Bureau  of  Statistics,  Characterization  and  Classification  of  Local 
Authorities by the Socioeconomic Level of the Population, 2003.   28 
•  The share of young people was collected from the Central Bureau of Statistics, 
Population and Housing Census, 1995. Due to the lack of other data on the 
share of young people, we used the share of children aged 0-14 years at the 
time of the census as a proxy for young people aged 10-24 at the time of the 
competition.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 